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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-4471
___________
BRENDA LEE SENEY,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-12-cv-01706)
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 2, 2014
Before: HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 26, 2014)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Brenda Lee Seney, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the
order of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware denying her motion
for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Commissioner”). In its decision, the District Court determined that

substantial evidence supported the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of
Seney’s application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). We will affirm for substantially the same
reasons set forth in the District Court’s opinion.
I.
In June 2009, Seney applied for DIB and SSI. Seney alleged that she was disabled
due to symptoms associated with multiple sclerosis (“MS”), which began in October
2007 when she was 35 years old. After the diagnosis, Seney began therapy and
treatment. Prior to the onset of the alleged disability, Seney, a high school graduate, held
a variety jobs including as a warehouse worker, fast food worker, and a cleaner. The ALJ
held a hearing, during which documentary evidence of Seney’s health was presented.
Seney, her spouse, and a vocational expert testified at the hearing.1
In her decision, the ALJ performed the five-step, sequential analysis for
determining whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a);
see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003). The ALJ determined: (1) Seney
was not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date; (2) Seney had
severe impairments; (3) Seney did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that was the same or equivalent to an impairment listed by the Social
Security Administration as presumptively precluding any gainful activity; (4) Seney was
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The District Court fully summarized the evidence and testimony presented during the
hearing in its opinion. See Seney v. Colvin, 982 F. Supp. 2d 345, 348-53 (D. Del. 2013).
2

unable to perform her past relevant work; and (5) Seney possessed sufficient residual
functional capacity to perform other available jobs in the national economy.
Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Seney was not disabled from October 2007
through the date of the decision.
The Appeals Council denied Seney’s request to review the ALJ’s decision, making
that decision the final decision of the Commissioner. In December 2012, Seney filed an
action in the District Court seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision denying her
claim for DIB and SSI. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. Seney timely
appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the ALJ’s legal conclusions and review the factual findings for substantial evidence.
Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Substantial
evidence is “‘more than a mere scintilla,’” and is defined as “‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate.’” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d
Cir. 1999) (quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995)). If the ALJ’s
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings,
even if we would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181
F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
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III.
Seney first argues that the ALJ did not sufficiently credit the opinions of her
treating physicians. While an ALJ must generally give great weight to a claimant’s
treating physician, an ALJ may discredit the treating physician’s opinion if other
evidence contradicts it. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c); Morales v. Apfel, 225
F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361. Here, it was
appropriate for the ALJ to discredit portions of the opinions of Seney’s treating
physicians. In particular, Dr. Lee Dresser’s opinion that Seney could stand or walk for
only less than two hours in an eight-hour day and was incapable of low stress jobs, was
not supported by objective medical evidence. Evidence showed that Seney’s MS had
improved with treatment and that she was free from various symptoms, including
weakness, numbness, and balance problems. Dr. Dresser’s own notes from treatment
indicated a fair prognosis, observing that Seney had near-normal strength in her lower
extremities and a stable gait. The ALJ fully credited Dr. Dresser’s opinion that Seney
could sit for six hours in an eight-hour day because the medical evidence supported that
opinion.
Dr. Fucci’s opinion, presented in the form of a written prescription, stated that
Seney had MS, that her condition was worsening, and that she would need to be out of
work. This opinion was also appropriately discredited. Principally, there were no
medical records or notes of treatment indicating how Dr. Fucci had arrived at his opinion,
and it was contrary to the evidence showing that Seney was responding positively to
4

treatment. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the
opinions of Dr. Dresser and Dr. Fucci were not wholly substantiated.
Next, Seney argues that the ALJ did not sufficiently credit her subjective
complaints of disabling symptoms. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the
Commissioner considers “all . . . symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which
[these] symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with objective medical
evidence . . . .” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). When evaluating subjective
complaints of disabling symptoms, the ALJ must assess the persistence and intensity of
the claimant’s pain as well as the extent to which it impairs her ability to work. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1529(c)(1), 416.929(c)(1). Allegations of disabling symptoms must be consistent
with objective medical evidence, and the ALJ must explain why any allegations were
rejected. See Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000).
The ALJ first determined that Seney had a medical impairment that could
reasonably be expected to produce pain and other symptoms. However, during the
second step of the inquiry, the ALJ determined that Seney could perform a range of
sedentary work despite her symptoms. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ considered
the treatment needed for Seney’s condition, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(v),
416.929(c)(3)(v); the positive results from that treatment, the medication that she was
taking, and its side effects, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv), 416.929(c)(3)(iv); her
ability to perform many daily functions, including managing her own personal care,
cooking, childcare, cleaning, and shopping, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i),
5

416.929(c)(3)(i); and the opinions of three state agency physicians who concluded that
she had a range of limitations on her ability to work but that she could ultimately perform
sedentary work. See Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 362. Consequently, the ALJ’s decision to not
credit Seney’s allegations of disabling pain and other symptoms is supported by
substantial evidence.
Seney also argues that the ALJ did not properly consider the vocational expert’s
testimony. In particular, Seney contends that the ALJ’s conclusion was contrary to the
vocational expert’s response to a hypothetical question. ALJs routinely pose hypothetical
questions to vocational experts in order to determine a claimant’s ability to perform
alternative employment. See Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 205-06 (3d
Cir. 2008). “‘While the ALJ may proffer a variety of assumptions to the expert, the
vocational expert’s testimony concerning a claimant’s ability to perform alternative
employment may only be considered for purposes of determining disability if the
question accurately portrays the claimant’s individual physical and mental impairments.’”
Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 123 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984)). The ALJ asked the vocational expert two hypothetical
questions. The first hypothetical question did not include all of Seney’s allegations of
disabling symptoms and posited that the individual could stand and walk in excess of two
hours in an eight-hour workday and that she could sit for six hours in a workday. In
response to that question, the vocational expert concluded that the hypothetical individual
could perform alternative work. The second hypothetical question included all of
6

Seney’s allegations of disabling symptoms. In that case, the vocational expert responded
that the individual could not perform alternative work. While Seney contends that the
ALJ should credit the vocational expert’s response to the second hypothetical, the ALJ
properly did not rely on that response because it included allegations of disabling
symptoms that, for the reasons discussed above, were not credibly established. Cf.
Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987).
Seney alleges that her condition has worsened since her hearing. However, those
new allegations are immaterial to the ALJ’s determination that Seney was not disabled
from October 2007 until the time of her hearing, and we are unable to review them. Cf.
Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592-93 (3d Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court that the
ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence.
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